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the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Based on the theory of salient perturbations,
we propose a strategic foundation of overcon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11. Introduction
Belief about one's abilities is an important ingredient in many decisions, including making career
choices, undertaking enterprises, and taking risks. There is considerable evidence that statements
people make about their abilities often don't accurately reect their real abilities. Well-known
studies in psychology and economics claim that people are overcondent in their ability (e.g.,
Svenson, 1981; Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg, 1989).
1 A key question concerns the roots of
such apparent overcondence in relative ability and the corresponding benets that might explain
the persistence of the phenomenon. For example, a commonly-suggested potential personal benet
from overcondence is the consumption value (ego utility, in the terminology of Koszegi, 2006)
derived from the belief that one is talented. In this view, people feel better with a favorable
self-perception, even at the cost of being overcondent and thus making wrong choices.
We consider here an alternative explanation, and postulate a strategic foundation of overcon-
dence. Statements or signals about one's beliefs are often sent to aect the belief of others about
one's ability or resources, so as to aect their decisions. This occurs in strategic situations, which
are common in social life. For instance, appearing more condent is likely to increase one's chances
to be hired for a job or to receive a promotion, and may discourage others from competing for that
same position or entering the same market. Or it may elicit cooperation by others if they are in
search for talented colleagues to start a joint project. In other situations however it may pay to
appear to be less skillful than one actually is. Such is the case of a pool hustler; one could also
employ this strategy in the workplace for example to elicit help by others.
Of course, appearing under or overcondent does not necessarily imply the subjective feeling of
under or overcondence by the person sending this signal. Trivers [1985] suggests, however, that it
is much easier for such a signal to be convincing if the sender believes it. An immediate question is
1Moore and Healy (2008) mention a taxonomy of overcondence, consisting of \(1) overestimation of one's actual
performance, (2) overplacement of one's performance relative to others, and (3) excessive precision in one's beliefs."In
this paper, we primarily consider the second of these categories, and hereafter refer to this as \overcondence". We
also note that while overcondence is found in many studies, there is mixed evidence (see for instance Clark and
Friesen, 2009) and its prevalence depends on factors such as personal experience (Weinstein, 1980) or task-diculty
(Kruger, 1999; Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005).
2therefore whether senders believe their own signals. Our results indeed seem to show that senders
are unaware that they are inating their signals.
We also propose that the use of overcondent statements extends to a larger set of environments
than those in which it is directly useful for strategic reasons: Since this policy is systematically
used in familiar situations in which this is strategically eective, it may then be adopted even when
no eect on other's behavior can be expected, provided the environment in which they are made is
similar to those in which such an eect would be reasonable. The extension of behavior to similar
environments where it may not be optimal may be facilitated if such behavior is automatic and
in part unconscious. This explanation relies upon the theoretical literature on bounded rational-
ity. The starting assumption is that cognitive limitations prevent people from calculating optimal
behavior in each and every situation. Instead, it is more reasonable to assume that people make
the same decisions in dierent situations that appear similar. This idea is presented in Myerson
(1991) and further developed in formal models by Samuelson (2001) and Jehiel (2005).
2 Myerson
(1991) proposes that apparent suboptimal behavior can sometimes be understood by assuming that
observed behavior is optimal in a related but more familiar environment, which he calls a salient
perturbation. Relying on this insight, we claim that biases in statements and beliefs over one's
ability can be explained as behavior that would be optimal in a familiar environment, but is not
optimal in the observed salient perturbations of that environment.
How do we test this hypothesis? The discipline imposed by the theory is that the environment
must satisfy three conditions. First, it has to be similar to the situation the individual is really
facing (has to be a perturbation). Second (familiarity), the perturbation must be more familiar to
the subject than the real situation. The degree of familiarity is measured by the frequency with
2Samuelson (2001) presents a formal model showing how salient perturbations may arise as optimal planning of
behavior in dierent environments with cognitive costs. He assumes that people plan their actions by keeping a stock
of models and matching situations they encounter to the analogies they have in mind. They must pay cognitive
costs for the planning, which are higher for more complex plans. Apparent anomalies in behavior (compared to the
optimal one) can be expected if situations are relatively rare but resemble a more frequently observed interaction.
Jehiel (2005) proceeds from the reasonable assumption that players bundle games and nodes at which other players
must move into analogy classes of games sharing some basic similarity. Players then only have to learn the average
behavior in each analogy class, and do not learn the behavior of his opponent at every single decision node or any
game. The solution concept proposed (called analogy-based expectation equilibrium) describes the interaction of
players forming their expectations on the basis of the average behavior of the opponent.
3which one faces a particular situation. Finally (optimality), the observed behavior must be optimal
in the salient perturbation of the actual game.
Many examples can be given. In visual perception individuals sometimes interpret what they
see in terms of a salient perturbation. When one is sitting in a stationary train, the movement of
another train is interpreted and perceived as self-motion (vection illusion; see Dichgans and Brandt,
1978). The link to Myerson's salient perturbations is clear: the real but unfamiliar situation (you
are still, the world is moving) is automatically interpreted by drawing on the more familiar situation
(you are moving, the world is still).
The vection example illustrates another property of salient perturbations. The attribution of
movement to one's own train is automatic, unconscious rather than a deliberate updating. Famil-
iarity aects the degree of awareness, as behavior becomes automated and unconscious in situations
that occur very frequently. By contrast, situations that look unfamiliar are more likely to induce
deliberate and reective behavior. To illustrate, people drive automatically on a familiar route
but have a heightened awareness of their environment when driving on an unfamiliar road. A
more deliberate and reective behavior is costly in terms of the attention that must be devoted to
information processing, so the use of automatic processes can be explained as cost reduction.
Our strategy to prove our claim about biases and beliefs is to set up an experiment where the
three conditions for a salient perturbation (perturbation, familiarity and optimality) are satised,
and then show that subjects' behavior conforms to our predictions. The perturbation condition
requires that we use games that are similar. This is done by introducing games that dier only in
one respect, but are otherwise identical. The optimality condition requires us to prove two claims.
First, we have to prove that overcondence is indeed an equilibrium behavior in the game we use.
We do so by presenting a formal analysis of the equilibrium in a simple model. This analysis is
necessary but not sucient: we must also prove that individuals in a game where the equilibrium
behavior requires overcondence are also behaving as theory predicts.
For the familiarity condition, it seems reasonable to state that environments where overcon-
dence is eective are widespread. We oer survey evidence that indicates that such environments
are indeed familiar to the subjects in our experiments. We also provide an additional test, by
4introducing a game where the strategically optimal behavior is instead to under-report condence.
We then show that subjects do so when such behavior is eective. Furthermore, since such environ-
ments are much less familiar to the subjects (also documented in our survey data), this response is
more likely to be a reective, thoughtful, deliberate response.
We now describe in some detail our experimental strategy and main ndings. We rst use an
incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit condence in one's relative ability in a cognitive task.
This allows us to detect overcondence in a non-strategic environment, where one would expect
that subjects (at least consciously) believe their reports. We nd that the mean level of stated
condence that one is in the top half of the group is 63.4, providing evidence consistent with
overcondence.
3 We then test whether reported condence is sensitive to social saliency and to
strategic considerations. We vary across treatments whether the sender's stated condence is shown
to a paired receiver (with common information) and also whether the receiver is then required
to compete with the sender in a tournament in which scores on the earlier cognition task are
compared, or whether the receiver has an available outside option. The sender is always entered
in the tournament. A comparison across treatments shows that the awareness that a mutually-
anonymous person will observe one's stated condence has no eect on the report made.
To test whether strategic considerations aect reports, we implemented two strategic treatments.
In both, a receiver could either enter the tournament or choose an outside option, after observing
the reported condence by the sender.
4 In the rst treatment (Deter), it was in the interest of the
sender to deter the receiver from entering the tournament. An analysis of the game shows that,
at equilibrium, senders over-report to appear strong and discourage receivers from entering the
tournament. In the experimental data we indeed nd evidence that male, but not female, senders
inate stated condence. In the second treatment (Lure), it is in the interest of the sender that the
receiver enters the tournament. In the data we nd evidence of under-reporting by senders, both
by males and by females, again consistent with the behavior at equilibrium of the game.
3In an environment of incomplete information, this is not per se conclusive evidence of overcondence (Benoit and
Dubra, 2011; Burks, Carpenter, Goette and Rustichini, 2013).
4Camerer and Lovallo (1999) also study entry decisions in a tournament in the context of overcondence. In contrast
to our experiment, participants in their experiment do not observe reported condence levels of others, and there is
no strategic reason to appear under- or overcondent.
5An interesting nding in the Deter treatment is that we also nd an increase in reported con-
dence by male players in the role of receiver, even though in our game receivers have no strategic
advantage from over-reporting. We interpret this as evidence that males over-report in this treat-
ment, even without a direct benet for doing so, because the situation looks familiar, and appearing
condent is optimal in the familiar environment. Since there is no basis for this choice to be cognitive
and conscious, this result suggests that male receivers are unaware that they are over-reporting, so
that they eectively believe (on a conscious level) their own reports. We suspect that male senders
also believe their statements, just as male receivers do.
The Lure treatment has a double interest for our test of the theory. First, it provides a test
of the idea that the condence in the statements about one's skill follows strategic considerations,
in the direction that is appropriate in the environment (which is not necessarily overcondence).
Second, this treatment has special interest because luring is a less familiar situation, and so we
would expect that a more reective type of behavior would be triggered as a result. Therefore, we
did not expect to nd that receivers in the Lure treatment would adjust their reported condence
in comparison to the baseline treatment, and the data show that indeed they do not.
In our experiment, receivers are very responsive to the reported condence of the senders; they
are highly likely to enter the tournament when their own stated condence is higher than that of
the paired sender, but highly unlikely to enter when the reverse is true.
Finally, the eect on entry decisions diers across genders. Females are signicantly less likely
than males to enter the tournament in the Deter treatment, despite very similar performance levels.
This eect is driven by condence level in the Deter treatment, as there is no signicant dierence
in entry rates when we control for condence. In the Lure treatment, both the stated condence
levels and entry rates for males and females were almost the same. Neither case supports the notion
that women shy away from competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
Our paper makes a number of novel contributions. First and foremost, we provide a strategic
foundation for expressed overcondence and undercondence, both in an equilibrium model and in
our experimental data. We study how reporting a level of condence is consistent with strategic
considerations, some of which may be processed at a subconscious level. Our results suggest
6that subjects seem to believe their inated reports (at least at a conscious level), so this in fact
appears to reect actual overcondence. Second, our evidence is consistent with the notion of
salient perturbations or at least some form of reasoning through similarity. Third, there are gender
dierences with respect to strategically inating condence, but not with respect to strategically
deating condence (which appears to be conscious and deliberate).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a review of the
literature. We describe our hypotheses and our experimental design in section 3. We present our
experimental results in section 4, and we discuss the motivation of biased condence in section 5.
We conclude in section 6.
2. Background and literature review
The idea of salient perturbations is consistent with some earlier experimental ndings. Framing
eects, for instance, can be understood by assuming that dierent descriptions of a task trigger
dierent analogies. A prisoner's dilemma framed as the \Community Game"elicits much more
cooperative behavior than if the very same game is framed as the \Wall St. Game"because the label
\Wall Street"is associated with more competitive behavior and the label \Community"suggests
sharing and cooperation (see Liberman et al., 2004). Likewise, cooperation with an anonymous
stranger in a one-shot game can be explained with predictions from the theory of repeated games
if the repeated game is the salient perturbation of the one-shot game.
Social psychology has long considered the issues of self-esteem, overcondence, and self-deception:
for example Baumeister (1998) provides an extensive review of the overcondence phenomenon; and
further evidence and discussion on the topic of self-esteem can be found in Leary, Tambor, Terdal,
and Downs (1995) and Leary (1999), where image concerns lead to a selective demand for informa-
tion. Berglas and Jones (1978) and Kolditz and Arkin (1982) also study how self-handicapping is re-
lated to social saliency: Kolditz and Arkin (1982) nd that subjects take performance-impoverishing
drugs after receiving positive feedback about their past performance when their choice of drugs is
7visible to the experimenter. However, when subjects choose whether or not to take the performance-
impoverishing drugs in private, no subjects take them. This suggests that performance/condence
is a social signal.
Rabin and Schrag (1999) provide a model of conrmatory bias, where people misinterpret new
information as supporting previously held views; in this model a conrmatory bias induces over-
condence. An agent may come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis, even though
he or she receives an unlimited amount of information. Koszegi (2006) provides a formal economic
model of overcondence and ego utility, in which an agent derives internal benets from positive
views about his or her ability. The mechanism in this model is that each person receives an initial
signal about own ability and can seek information if desired.
A number of recent papers examine overcondence. The focus is typically on establishing over-
condence without considering the strategic value of appearing overcondent or undercondent and
the response to condence statements by others. In some recent experiments, participants receive
information about the stated condence of others (e.g., Vialle et al., 2011; Ewers, 2012), but they
do not study if participants use this strategically: condence levels were elicited before participants
were told that their reported condence would be shared with others.
Burks, Carpenter, Goette and Rustichini (2012), based on data in Burks et al. (2009), investigate
whether concerns for self-image contribute to overcondence and whether condence judgments are
consistent with Bayesian information processing starting from a common prior. They reject both
hypotheses. Their results indicate that individuals with higher beliefs about their skills are more
likely to demand information, rather than less likely. These results clearly reject self-image concerns
as a mechanism that yields overcondent judgments, and are consistent with the hypothesis that
overcondence is a form of social signaling. In their experimental design there is no strategic
environment that can aect condence, so a direct test of the hypothesis is dicult. In this paper
we introduce the strategic environment explicitly, and study the strategic motivation underlying
such signaling.
Other studies investigate a related question: Is overcondence a result of biased information
processing with regard to own skills? Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2011) study how
8subjects respond to noisy feedback about their performance in an IQ test, and nd that subjects do
not update suciently and also react more to positive feedback than to negative feedback. Ertac
(2011) also nds a systematic bias in updating when participants receive feedback about their
performance on an algebra and verbal test. By contrast, she nds no systematic bias in updating
when the feedback is not related to performance but on some neutral task. The systematic mistakes
on the performance related task tend to go against self-serving beliefs, as here people are more
aected by bad news than by good, resulting in pessimistic beliefs. Eil and Rao (2011) nd that
people respond much more to positive feedback than to negative feedback about their intelligence
or beauty. In a non-own-performance control treatment, updating and information acquisition
were unbiased. In one of the treatments of our experiment, we also give imperfect feedback to
participants about their performance, and nd that they often make errors in their updating.
When we present them with a task that has an identical statistical structure but which is not
related to their performance, they rarely make updating errors.
Grossman and Owens (2012) study how one's beliefs about own performance (on a quiz) are
aected by noisy, but unbiased feedback. In the main treatment, participants overestimate their
own scores, believing that they have received unlucky feedback. However, this is driven not by
biased information processing, but rather by overcondent priors. In a control treatment, each
participant expresses beliefs about another participant's performance, with (on average) accurate
posteriors. Even though feedback improves estimates about performance, this does not lead to
improved estimates of relative performances. This result suggests that how people use performance
feedback to update beliefs about own ability diers from how they update their beliefs about own
performance, which may relate to the issue of why overcondence persists.
3. Hypotheses and Experimental Design
3.1. Model. The key tool we use to test our hypotheses is a tournament game where players can
send explicit statements on their ability. A simple model may illustrate this game. There are two
players. One of them (the sender, player 1) sends a message about her ability. The other player
(the receiver, player 2) then decides whether to enter a tournament with the sender. Players can
9have dierent types, reecting dierent abilities relevant in the tournament. The type of player
i; i 2 i; is chosen according to some probability distribution, and is private information to
the player. To simplify the exposition we assume that the set of types has only two elements,
i  fi
0;i
1g with 1 of better quality than 0 and that the prior of players is that both types are
equally likely to occur.
The sender moves rst, and makes a claim about her ability by sending a message t 2 T = 1:
The message need not be truthful, but sending a false message has a lying cost c > 0. After
observing the message, the receiver can choose an action from the set fIn; Outg: If the receiver
chooses Out; both players receive their outside option Oi: If the receiver chooses In, both players
compete in a tournament, and their payos are determined by their abilities and are given by:
(1)
2
0 2
1
1
0 0;0 b;a
1
1 a;b d;d
We focus on the case for which a player is better o if the opponent is weaker (b  0; d  a)
and if she herself is stronger (a  0;d  b): To avoid trivial cases we assume a  O2  d; so that
a strong receiver weakly prefers playing the tournament to the outside option if he knows that the
sender is a weak type, but prefers the outside option if he knows that the sender is a strong type.
We also assume that d  0, implying that a weak receiver always weakly prefers to stay out (since
O2  d  0  b).
This game reects situations in which people can strategically manipulate how condent they
appear to others. Under the assumptions made, a weak receiver will always opt out of the tour-
nament, but for a strong receiver this choice will depend on his beliefs about the sender's type.
The best strategy for the sender depends crucially on her outside option. If her outside option is
high, she is better o when she does not have to compete with the receiver in the tournament. The
sender can try to achieve this by appearing strong, i.e., over-report, to convince the receiver to opt
out. On the other hand, if her outside option is low, she prefers that the receiver competes with
10her. In this case, the sender can try to achieve this by appearing weak, i.e., under-report. Indeed,
both over- and under-reporting may occur in equilibrium (see Appendix B for details).5
In the experiment, we implemented two conditions. 1) In the Deter treatment, parameters are
such that senders over-report in equilibrium (i.e., claim to be a higher type than they really are).
2) In the Lure treatment, senders under-report in equilibrium. While our experimental design
accommodates both under and over-reporting, we argue (and provide survey evidence) that the
luring environment is relatively rare. In our signaling game, if the payo of players is higher if the
opponent is a stronger type, only equilibria with over-reporting exist for reasonable parameters.
Mating games are a prominent example of these games: players compete for mating with strong
types. These games are very common in nature so that overcondence can be expected to be
advantageous more frequently than under-condence. An example at the workplace that has the
structure of a mating game is when an employee wants to convince co-workers that he or she is
talented, so that he or she will be chosen to collaborate on a joint project.
3.2. Hypotheses. We now state our theoretical hypotheses.
H1: Statements of condence are typically social signals of intentions or private information,
and individuals take them into account when they observe the self-evaluations of others. This is a
rst-order awareness of the social implications of self-condence. Individuals may also anticipate
this eect and adjust this signal accordingly, a second-order awareness.
Thus in our experiment stated condence levels will be aected in the direction predicted by the
equilibrium in strategic environments, where the setting is explicit and the advantages are real and
clear.
H2: In our experiment, higher stated condence levels will tend to discourage potential com-
petitors from entering the tournament. Similarly, lower stated levels will encourage competitors to
enter. So accurate reporting of condence levels is not an optimal strategy, even taking into account
the incentives for accurate reporting.
5Kartik (2009) also analyzes a sender-receiver game with lying costs. The game he analyzes has a dierent setup, so
we cannot directly apply his results. He shows that in his setup senders almost always claim to be more condent
than they really are, but the payo structure diers from ours.
11Thus both stated overcondence and undercondence can be motivated by strategic considera-
tions, and subjects behave according to the equilibrium predictions in both types of environment.
H3: Overcondence in statements that is useful in familiar competitive environments will extend
to similar, but less familiar situations, and such stated overcondence is likely to occur even when
no one else is watching. For example, we will observe overcondence in the baseline treatment
where competition is absent.
Thus we predict overcondence even when one's condence level is unknown to other participants,
in spite of the incentives provided for stating beliefs truthfully. This extension will be smaller or
even absent for stated undercondence, because environments where stating undercondence is
optimal are less widely experienced.
In light of the evidence that males and females respond dierently to competitive environments
(see e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), we also
consider the possibility that condence display diers across genders. We predict that males are
more likely to enter the tournament than females, controlling for condence.
H4: Males will exhibit higher stated condence levels and are more likely to enter the tournament
than females, even after controlling for performance.
3.3. Experimental design. Sessions were conducted in Amsterdam with 16 to 28 participants
depending on the number of subjects showing up for the experimental session. Instructions were
displayed on a computer screen and read aloud. Participants were told that their decisions would
remain anonymous to the other people present unless explicitly indicated otherwise, and that they
would receive their earnings in an envelope from a person in a dierent room who could only see
login numbers and could not match these numbers to names or faces. Participants were paid for
one task chosen at random.
We ran a total of 22 sessions with a total of 464 subjects; seven of Treatment 1 (N = 144), three
of Treatment 2 (N = 68), seven of Treatment 3 (three with low outside option, N = 60, four with
high, N = 96), and ve of Treatment 4 (N = 96). Sessions lasted for 40 to 50 minutes, with an
12average payment of e14 (of which e7 was a show-up fee). Sessions ended with a questionnaire.
Almost all participants (96 percent) were undergraduate students (average age 22 years, standard
deviation 2.96; see Table 2 for details), with the majority studying economics or business; 44 percent
of these subjects were female.
In every treatment, participants were randomly allocated to groups of four individuals. In each
group, two players were randomly given the role of senders and the other two the role of receiver
(in the instructions we always used neutral labels \A" and \B" for the two roles); each sender
was randomly matched with one receiver. All participants received the same 15 questions taken
from Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), a measure of cognitive ability (Raven, 2000).
Participants had eight minutes to answer as many questions as they could, and did not get any
feedback after completion on the number of questions they answered correctly. The experimental
instructions can be found in Appendix A. Payments were presented in points: One point was worth
one euro. In the period in which the experiment was run e1 was worth approximately between $1.30
and $1.40. In the exposition below we translate points directly into euro, although the instructions
were strictly in terms of points.
When taking the APM test, participants only knew that they would be asked to evaluate their
performance later and that every sender would be matched to a receiver with a possibility for the
player with the higher rank to earn 10 points, that is, e10. Upon completion, participants were
informed about all the subsequent steps in the experiment. First, one was asked to indicate one's
condence of having a score in the top two of their group, on a probability scale from 0 percent to
100 percent. They received payment for accuracy according to a quadratic scoring rule; for a stated
probability p (their report divided by 100), a subject was paid e10 times 1 (1 p)2 if he really was
in the top 2, and e10 times 1   p2 if he was not. As can be seen in the instructions, we provided
assurances that this mechanism favored accurate reporting for this part of the experiment.
Table 1 gives an overview of the dierent treatments. In the baseline treatment, no one could see
the condence of another player; each receiver could observe the reported condence by the paired
sender in the other treatments. In all treatments there was a possible tournament between the
paired sender (S) and receiver (R). In Treatments 1-3, the player with higher rank received e10
13and the other received nothing. Entry by both players was mandatory in Treatments 1 and 2, but
each R faced a strategic decision in Treatments 3 and 4: After observing S's reported condence,
R chose whether or not to enter a tournament. In the low-outside-option version of Treatment 3, R
received e3.5 by staying out, while in the high-outside-option version of Treatment 3, R received
e5.5 for doing so.6 In these treatments, S preferred that R opted out of the tournament since that
would secure e10. In Treatment 4, if R chose not to enter, R received e5.5 and S received e10.
If R chose to enter and won, then R received e10 and S received e15, while if R entered and S
won, then R received 0 and S received e25; thus, S preferred that R enter the tournament. In
Treatments 3 and 4 participants must trade o honest reporting against trying to inuence the
opponent's entry decision.
The description we have just given, including whether or not any player could see the reported
condence of others, or whether player R was given a choice between playing in or out, was common
information and known to all subjects before they reported their condence. They were also told,
in all treatments, that they would nd out at the end of the game who had the higher rank between
the two matched S and R players, but would learn neither their rank in the group of four nor the
number of questions answered correctly.
6We initially used an outside option of e3.5, but found that 28 of 30 receivers entered the tournament. We then
switched to an outside option of e5.5.
14Table 1: Overview of treatments
Treatment
Receiver observes
Sender's reported
condence?
Payos if receiver
opts out of
tournament (S;R)
Payos if receiver
enters tournament (S;R)
Sender wins Receiver wins
1: Baseline No N/A (10,0) (0,10)
2: Social Yes N/A (10,0) (0,10)
3a. Deter (low) Yes (10, 3.5) (10,0) (0,10)
3b. Deter (high) Yes (10, 5.5) (10,0) (0,10)
4. Lure Yes (10, 5.5) (25,0) (15,10)
Notes: S stands for Sender, R for Receiver.
Treatment 1 had some additional components in which we presented some updating tasks to
participants. Since we will not describe the results of that part in much detail, we only briey
outline the experimental setup.7 First, after reporting their condence, participants were sent a
report telling them if they were among the top 2 of their group or not. This report was not
always correct, which was known to participants. After receiving the report, they were asked if
the report was most likely to be correct or incorrect. We subsequently gave subjects an abstract
scenario about two machines that produced rings that were faulty with some known probability.
After telling them whether the ring was faulty, we asked participants from which machine the ring
most likely came. The setup had an identical statistical structure to the updating task about their
condence, allowing us to compare updating errors when feedback is given about their ability and
feedback in an abstract context. Both the report and the machine question were incentivized.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Condence. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. The distribution of correct answers
(out of 15) is approximately normal, with mean 8.75 (8.78 for males and 8.71 for females). No more
7A detailed description is available upon request.
15than 27 percent report a condence level below 50 percent in any of our conditions; note however
that the rate in the Lure treatment (27 percent) was nearly double that in the deterrence treatment
(14 percent). In data pooled over the conditions, 71 percent of the people report a condence level
above 50 percent and only 20 percent report a condence level below 50 percent; a binomial test
nds this asymmetry to be highly signicant (Z = 17:00, p = 0:000).
Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Error Min. Max.
Test
Number correct answers 8.75 0.11 1 15
Condence 63.75 1.02 0 100
Background characteristics
Age 21.96 0.14 17 49
Number of siblings 1.48 0.05 0 7
Gender (fraction females) 0.44
Member of sports club 0.49
Took Raven test before 0.54
Familiar with condition probs. 0.61
Study category
Economics/Business/Finance 0.58
Social Sciences and Law 0.15
Physics, Math, Computer science 0.07
Other study or not student 0.20
N 464
Figure 1 shows the condence of senders and receivers in each treatment by gender. We did
not expect to nd a dierence in stated condence between senders and receivers in the baseline
treatment, since their roles do not dier in that treatment, and indeed we do not nd any: the
condence of males is 65 in both roles, and that of female senders and receivers is respectively 60
and 62. We therefore pool the observations of senders and receivers in the baseline treatment.
16Figure 1. Condence of senders and receivers, by gender and treatment.
Roles pooled in the baseline treatment. Error bars: +/- SE
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Compared to the baseline treatment, male senders in the social treatment report three percentage
points higher condence, a dierence that is not signicant (WMW, Z =  0:789, p = 0:430, two
tailed test). They do however report signicantly higher condence in the deterrence treatments
(73 percent, low and high outside option combined, Z =  2:342, p = 0:019) and signicantly lower
condence in the Lure treatment (53 percent, Z = 2:007, p = 0:045). Male receivers also report
signicantly higher condence in the Deter treatments (76 percent, Z =  2:949; p = 0:003), while
their reported condence in the lure treatment is comparable to that of males in the baseline treat-
ment (65 percent, Z =  0:437; p = 0:662). The reported condence of females is not statistically
dierent from that in the baseline treatment in any of the other treatments, except that female
17senders report a signicantly lower condence of 51 in the Lure treatment (Z = 1:779, p = 0:075;
two-tailed test).
OLS estimates of the determinants of condence are presented in Table 3; the baseline condition
reects male behavior in the baseline treatment (Treatment 1). Specication (1) shows that the
number of correct answers is a strong predictor of condence, adding about 3 percentage points for
each correct answer; this result is robust over dierent specications.
Since subjects were not told their number of correct answers, the eect of correct answers on
stated condence can only be based on an estimate of one's own relative ability. In addition,
we nd signicantly lower stated condence in the Lure treatment, although the eect of the
strategic-Deter treatment is not quite signicant. Specication (2) adds controls for the role of the
participant (sender or receiver) and interaction terms for the treatment and role. Being a Sender has
no eect by itself, nor is there a signicant interaction eect with the Social and Deter treatments.
However, there is a large interaction eect in the Lure treatment, indicating that the decrease in
stated condence is entirely due to senders; in fact, the coecient on Lure is now actually positive,
although not signicant.
[Table 3 about here { See Appendix D for the tables with regressions]
We introduce a dummy for gender and interaction eects for gender and treatment in specication
(3). The results are consistent with the picture of the nonparametric tests. We nd a negative
but insignicant direct gender eect. However, there is a signicant treatment eect: Reported
condence increases by almost 10 percentage points in the Deter treatment. This eect is only
present for males, as the coecient of the interaction between Deter and Female shows a negative
coecient of about the same size as the treatment coecient. On the other hand, there is no such
dierence by gender in the Lure treatment, indicating that both male and female senders deate
stated condence. There is no signicant dierence for sender or with the interaction of either
Deter or Lure and Sender, and none for the three-way interactions. Finally, specication (4) shows
that people who indicated they were familiar with conditional probabilities are more condent, by
18more than four percentage points. This familiarity has a signicant eect even accounting for the
dierence in the number of correct answers (9.10 with familiarity versus 8.20 without it).
4.2. Salient perturbations. Male receivers in the Deter treatment inate their condence levels
to about the same degree as the senders (the coecient for the interaction variable Deter*Sender
in Table 3 is small and insignicant). The receivers' inated levels of stated condence cannot
deter senders from entry and is known to not even be observed, so this cannot reect deliberate
cognitive planning. It may instead reect unconscious motivations generated by the competitive
setting, so that people may not be exible enough to adjust their behavior to their contingent role
in the deterrence environment.
The receivers' behavior can be explained by assuming that the salient perturbation of the game
is the game in which both players have a strategic value of deterring the other players. This
explanation requires that situations in which it is benecial to appear overcondent are familiar
to participants, and that receivers would not adjust their stated condence levels in an unfamiliar
environment. The purpose of the Lure treatment was to test this prediction, on the presumption
that situations in which it is benecial to appear undercondent are unfamiliar. Receiver behavior
is indeed consistent with this prediction.
The presumption that environments where it is benecial to appear overcondent are more
familiar than environments where it is benecial to appear undercondent seems reasonable and is
also supported by additional survey evidence that we collected. We asked a new set of participants to
rate the familiarity of the two types of situations on a 5-point scale, ranging from very rarely to very
frequently (82 participants, 49 percent female, recruited from the same subject pool as for the main
experiment).8 The results are reported in Figure 2. The modal responses of the participants are that
situations involving undercondence happen rarely and that situations involving overcondence are
quite frequent. The hypothesis that the distributions are equal is rejected (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test, D = 0:346, p < 0:001). Thus, the results provide clear evidence that appearing overcondent
is more familiar to our participants.
8See Appendix C for more details.
19Figure 2. Perceived frequency of situations where appearing undercon-
dent (left) or overcondent (right) can be eective. The category "(very)
rare" pools the answers "rare" and "very rare," and the category "(very) frequent"
pools the answers "frequent" and "very frequent."
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
(very) rare neutral (very) frequent
Overconfidence
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
(very) rare neutral (very) frequent
Underconfidence
Results (Condence)
(1) The real performance of participants, measured by the (unknown to the participants) number
of correct answers, signicantly inuences reported condence in the expected directions.
Those people who are familiar with conditional probabilities also report higher condence,
after controlling for correct answers.
(2) Men report a signicant 10 percentage points higher condence in the Deter treatment, even
though it is only known after taking the test (but before the statement is given) that there
will be strategic interaction. There is no signicant treatment eect for women.
(3) There is also a signicant treatment eect in the Lure treatment, as both male and female
senders deate their stated condence by about 15 percentage points. However, receivers do
not deate stated condence at all.
20(4) The only case in which there is a dierence in stated condence between Senders and Re-
ceivers is the Lure treatment, where there is a dierence for both males and females. In the
Deter treatment, the similarity of the behavior of male players in the two roles may reect
an automatic response to competition on an unconscious level.
The condence reports in the Deter and Lure treatments will be discussed again in the analysis
of the strategic behavior of participants. Here we only mention that we cannot reject rational
Bayesian updating using the Burks et al. (2013) allocation function. This may reect our having
only two intervals, either above or below the median.
4.3. Voluntary tournament entry. In the Deter and Lure treatments, player R chooses whether
to enter a tournament with player S, who is automatically entered into the tournament. This
result contrasts with the other treatments in which both people are automatically entered into the
tournament: when entry is not automatic R can take into account S's reported condence before
deciding whether to enter the tournament. Player S in turn knew that player R would observe his
statement (and player R knew this, etc., since the instructions were read aloud and so were known
to be identical for all participants), and could potentially anticipate the eect of the statement
on player R's decision. S does not observe R's statement, so this statement could not aect R's
behavior. In light of this, what determines player R's choice?
Our data show that with the high outside option in the Deter treatment and in the Lure treat-
ment, player R is much more likely to enter the tournament when own condence is higher and
when the opponent's condence is lower.9 Indeed, as is shown in Figure 3, we observe that relative
condence is a phenomenally good predictor of entry.
In the Deter case, 23 of 25 receivers (92.0%) enter when their condence level is at least as large
as the paired sender's reported condence level, while only four of 23 receivers (17.4%) enter when
their condence level is lower than the paired sender's reported condence level; the dierence
in these proportions is highly signicant (Z = 5:21, p = 0:000). The corresponding data for the
Lure treatment show that 28 of 32 (87.5%) choose to enter with higher stated condence and ve
9We focus primarily on entry with the high outside option, since 28 of 30 receivers chose entry with the low outside
option, so that statistical tests have little power.
21of 16 (31.2%) choose to enter with lower stated condence; the dierence in these proportions is
highly signicant (Z = 3:96, p = 0:000). Thus, there is strong potential for senders to inuence the
receiver's decision.
Figure 3. Entry by lower condence. Error bars: +/- SE
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In the Deter treatment, we nd that males enter twice as frequently as do females, 75.0 percent
versus 37.5 percent (Z = 2:62, p = 0:009, two-tailed test), as is shown in Figure 4. However, this
does not reect a dierence in performance: females in the R role in the high-option condition do
nearly as well as males on the Raven test (the mean score for males is 9.12 and the mean score
for females is 8.88; Wilcoxon ranksum test: Z = 0:28, p = 0:779, two-tailed test). At rst glance,
this seems to be evidence that females are per se averse to competition. However, female receivers
state signicantly lower condence levels than do male receivers in this condition, 56.63 versus
75.83 (Z = 3:07, p = 0:002, two-tailed test). Men choose to compete more frequently, but this
reects a higher stated condence level. This eect is only seen for people who choose to enter the
tournament; the average stated condence level for male entrants is 84.17 versus 69.89 for female
22entrants, while this comparison is 50.83 versus 48.67 for male non-entrants and female non-entrants,
respectively.
The results are quite dierent in the Lure treatment, where the entry rate for males (65.22
percent) is lower than the entry rate for females (72.00 percent). Similarly, the average stated
condence level for male entrants is 73.87 versus 69.00 for female entrants, while the average stated
condence level for male non-entrants is 49.62 versus 49.00 for female non-entrants, so we can see
that the stated condence levels for receivers in the Lure treatment is largely unaected by gender.
The performance level was 8.82 for males and 8.56 for females, not signicantly dierent (Wilcoxon
ranksum test: Z = 0:20, p = 0:843, two-tailed test).
Figure 4. Entry by gender. Error bars: +/- SE
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Table 4 reports the probit estimates of the decisions to enter the tournament.10 The rst three
columns apply to the high outside-option sessions of the Deter treatment, and the last three columns
apply to the Lure treatment. Specication (1) shows that own condence increases the likelihood of
10Estimates from the Linear Probability Model are qualitatively very similar to the reported Probit marginal eects.
23entering the tournament, and the condence of the opponent decreases it. Each variable substan-
tially aects the probability of entering. Specication (2) includes a dummy variable that simply
compares if own condence is higher or lower than that of the opponent. Controls in (3) for gender,
number of correct answers, and risk aversion have no signicant eect. Thus, the lower likelihood
of entry by females seems driven by lower condence, rather than less competitiveness. This also
suggests that males are not just reporting higher condence, but also feel more condent. If they
were just reporting higher condence without believing it, then, controlling for condence, males
should have been less likely to enter the tournament. The three specications for the Lure treat-
ment give similar results, with smaller magnitudes, but the coecient for own condence is not
signicant. Note that once again there is no evidence that women are per se less likely to enter.
Our analysis suggests that receivers follow a simple rule to make their entry decision, entering
if and only if their own condence is at least as high as the reported condence of the sender. To
test how precise this description is we check it against the data, and nd that the rule correctly
classies 87.5% of the receivers' decisions in the Deter treatment (high outside option), and 81.25%
in the Lure treatment. Moreover, most of the incorrectly classied decisions are close to the cuto
level. Hence, receivers appear to take the condence statements at face value instead of deating
them in the Deter treatment or inating them in the Lure treatment.
[Table 4 about here]
Results (Tournament Entry)
(1) When deciding whether to enter the tournament, participants are more likely to enter when
their condence is higher; they are also sensitive to the condence reported by the opponent:
If own stated condence is lower than that of the opponent, subjects are far less likely to
enter.
(2) Females are less likely to enter the competition in the Deter treatment, but this eect is
mainly due to the dierence in condence. Once we control for condence, the entry rate
24of women is not signicantly lower. There is no entry dierence in the Lure treatment,
regardless of whether or not we control for condence.
4.4. Updating errors. The additional parts in Treatment 1 allows us to test the hypothesis that
the patterns of stated condence that we observe are only due to errors in Bayesian updating. In
that treatment, we gave feedback to participants about their rank in the group, but the feedback
was not always correct. Participants were informed about the likelihood of receiving positive or
negative feedback conditional on their actual rank. We then ask them to update their beliefs about
being in the top 2. We also presented an abstract task with a similar statistical structure. Similar
to Ertac (2011) and Eil and Rao (2011), we nd that participants make much more updating errors
with regard to their own ability than in the abstract updating task. For instance, after receiving
negative feedback about their rank, many participants did not react strongly enough to the bad
news, while others gave it too much weight.11 Our results are in line with the other studies that nd
a dierence in updating mistakes between performance and non-performance related tasks (Ertac,
2011; Eil and Rao, 2011).
5. Self confidence and its motivations
What do these results tell us about the origin and motivation of overcondence? One key
potential motivation for being overcondent that has been suggested is the ego utility that one
derives, producing an increase in self-esteem. In our data we observe substantial overcondence
even when it is known that the stated condence level is not observed by the other player. This
nding suggests that people are either poor judges of probabilities, or that they receive some
internal benet from this inated belief, or that think they might inuence others' behavior. The
fact that people make far fewer updating errors on a neutral task than on a performance related
11We should note, however, that these results may be biased by the way that we provided incentives to participants.
The feedback was constructed in such a way that participants with a condence above 2/3rds should respond dif-
ferently to negative feedback than those with a condence below 2/3rds. The use of the quadratic score rule to
elicit condence levels is only incentive compatible for risk-neutral subjects. Risk-averse subjects may therefore be
misclassied, because they may have had a condence above 2/3rds but report a condence below 2/3rds. This may
lead us to wrongly conclude that they made an updating error.
25task suggests that the explanation of this overcondence is not simply poor ability to estimate
probability of events.
Our results are consistent with our general hypothesis that views strategic concerns as a primary
source of overcondence. In fact we see strong evidence that an increase (decrease) in a sender's
reported condence can have deterrent (encouragement) value in terms of inducing the receiver
into (or out of) the tournament. We also see some evidence (see Figure 1 and Table 3) that males
report higher condence in the strategic condition than in the baseline treatment. How close is this
behavior to that which is optimal for senders? We take this up in the next subsection.
5.1. Optimality of decisions.
Behavior of receivers. We already saw that much of the behavior of receivers can be explained by
the simple rule that a receiver enters if and only if his own condence is at least as high as the
reported condence of the sender.
Optimal reporting. If we assume that receivers indeed play this strategy, and that senders anticipate
this, we can analyze the best response of senders. We will model this by assuming that players
have types,  2 [0;100]; that are drawn from a continuous distribution function with density
f(): We index players by i = S;R (sender and receiver respectively). Players choose a message
ti 2 T = [0;100]; so that the message space is the same as the type space. The message of a player
is his reported condence, and the type is his true belief about his condence. In our experiment
a receiver has no incentives to report a condence that diers from his type, so we assume tr = r:
After observing ts; receivers choose an action in the set fOut;Ing. The assumed strategy of the
receiver is then to play In if and only if tr  ts:
Let OS be the sender's outside option payo if the receiver chooses Out: If the receiver chooses
In, the sender's payo is vh if he wins and vl if he loses. The probability that the sender wins is
(s;r): We will specify precise functional forms of . The expected payo for the sender of the
tournament is then given by:
(2)
Z ts
0
OSdF(r) +
Z 100
ts
((s;r)(vh   vl) + vl)dF(r):
26The reason for reporting an inaccurate condence level is to change the probability that the
receiver chooses In: The optimal reported condence for a risk-neutral sender is determined by:
(3) f(ts)[OS   (s;ts)(vh   vl)   vl] = c(ts   s):
The RHS reects the fact that players have the incentive provided by the quadratic scoring rule
to report truthfully, creating costs when their reported condence diers from their true belief
(where c = 2=10;000). In the Deter treatment, the term in brackets on the LHS is positive so that
over-reporting is optimal (OS = vh = 10;vl = 0), while in the Lure treatment this term is negative
so that underreporting is optimal (OS = 10;vh = 25;vl = 15).
We specify
(4) (s;r) = 1=(1 + e (s r));
where  = :021 is estimated from the data of the baseline treatment in which there are no incentives
to over-report. For F(); we assume that players believe that types are normally distributed
(truncated at 0 and 100) with mean 50 and standard deviation 21. The value of the standard
deviation is estimated from the data and we take a mean of 50 to reect that players do not believe
that other players are on average overcondent.
Figure 5 plots the optimal reporting for senders under the assumptions made. The thin solid
line represents truthful reporting. The thick solid line represents the optimal report in the Deter
treatment, and the dashed line for the Lure treatment. In both treatments it is optimal for senders
to deviate substantially from their true belief. For instance, the optimal report for a sender with
a condence of 60 is 80 in the Deter treatment, and 20 in the Lure treatment. In both cases the
optimal deviation from truthful reporting is substantially larger than what the data show. Based on
reported condence levels in the baseline treatment, we should expect that the average condence
is about 20 higher in the Deter treatment (we nd roughly zero for females and 10 for males),
and 45 lower in the Lure treatment (we nd about 10-15 lower). We should also nd no reported
condence below 60 in the deterrence treatment (because even for type 0 the optimal report is
27above 60), or above 30 in the Lure treatment (because even for type 100 the optimal report is
below 30), but we see quite a few examples in the data.
Figure 5. Optimal reporting by receivers given the behavior of senders.
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We conclude that the behavior of senders goes in the right direction, but not far enough.12 The
fact that they do not exactly match the estimated optimal levels for reports is not surprising. They
must form expectations about several parameters, e.g., those related to the distribution of types,
and they only play the game once.
Receivers, on their turn, appear to take the condence statements at face value instead of de-
ating them in the Deter treatment or inating them in the Lure treatment, as they simply seem
to compare their own condence to the reported condence by the sender. This behavior is an
indication that receivers also do not anticipate a level of over- and underinating as high as our
estimated optimal reports.
12The exact magnitude depends on the assumptions we make. In particular, the distribution of types matters. We
have also estimated optimal reporting for alternative distributions (assuming a dierent mean or a uniform instead
of normal distribution) but the underinating and deating seems robust to dierent specications.
28We close this section with two remarks. First, we have so far used informally the terms similar
and familiar. The notion of similarity is intuitive, but can also be formalized (see, for example,
Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995). Regarding familiarity, this would appear to primarily relate to the
frequency of this and similar experiences.
The second remark is that we are only able to measure statements of condence and it a question
of interest whether those people who make overcondent statements (or undercondent statements
in the lure treatment) actually believe these statements. At least in the cases of the baseline
treatment or the receiver role in the other treatments, there is no cognitive reason to misrepresent
beliefs, so one might claim that people believe their reports. We suspect that senders in the Deter
treatment also believe their statements, in the same manner as do the receivers. On the other hand,
we speculate that senders in the Lure treatment, where we have argued that cognitive resources are
engaged, do not believe their own statements of condence. On a deeper level, if the subconscious
mind is a player in the game, who is doing the believing? Projecting high self-condence is easiest
when one is also convinced of one's ability. Trivers [1985] points out that self-deception requires
hiding the truth from yourself to hide it more deeply from others and suggests that this can be a
useful strategy. So it is not completely clear who may be fooling whom.
6. Conclusion
Our experiments examined the determinants of self-condence, and the degree to which it reects
strategic concerns about social image. Our main conclusion is that levels of stated condence are
likely to be inuenced by strategic interest, perhaps unconsciously processed. We see evidence
that people will inate or deate statements of condence levels, in spite of the monetary incentive
to provide them truthfully, when doing so is strategically benecial. We suggest that inating
condence when doing so is not strategically benecial can be explained with the notion of salient
perturbations. In familiar situations overcondence quite often has strategic value so that we may
also observe it in non-strategic environments that are similar to the familiar situation.
Our novel strategic environment (in which another party observes the stated condence level
of another and then chooses whether or not to enter a tournament with this other person) allows
29a direct test of the strategic-interest hypothesis. First, the social signal is perceived and has
consequences: subjects in our experiment do respond to statements about condence made by
others, taking that information into account when choosing whether or not to enter. In the Deter
treatment, male (but not female) participants on average report signicantly higher condence
levels than in the non-strategic treatments. Inated condence serves as an eective deterrent.
Interestingly, males (but not females) do so in both roles, even when deterrence is impossible; this
suggests processing on an unconscious level.
In the less-familiar lure environment, we observe deated condence for both men and women in
the role of senders, which serves to encourage entry. We argue that conscious cognition is present
in this less-familiar environment, and indeed receivers do not deate their own reports. Strategic
deterrence and luring are consistent with the equilibrium we characterize; the degree to which one
engages in costly strategic distortion depends on the values of the parameters in the game.
When inated reported condence is strategic, it is natural to nd gender dierences in our par-
ticipants' behavior, given the evidence of other gender dierences such as with respect to nancial
risk preferences (Charness and Gneezy 2010, 2012), competition (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini
2003), and even shame (Ludwig and Thoma 2012). But since luring is a much less familiar envi-
ronment and strategic distortion is presumably driven by cognitive ability (which is the same for
men and women on the Raven test), we see men and women engaging equally in this behavior.
We also nd no evidence that women shy away from competition. While men choose to enter a
tournament much more frequently than women do in the Deter treatment, our regressions show no
dierence when one controls for condence; there is no dierence in entry rates or stated condence
in the Lure treatment. So women are not less competitive than men in our data.
There are a number of directions for future research. Two are most prominent, and concern the
degree in which individuals are aware of the strategic implications of their signaling. Is some of the
observed behavior truly unconscious? To what extent is self-deception present?
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34Appendix A. Instructions
The comments in square brackets are meant to illustrate instructions to the reader and were not
part of the instructions.
General instructions
Introduction Welcome to our experiment. You will receive e7 for showing up, regardless of
the results. The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully, you can earn a substantial
amount of money in addition to your show up fee. Throughout the stages we will ask you to answer
questions. At each stage, you will receive more detailed instructions.
You will be part of a group of 4 persons. You don't know who the other persons are, and you
will remain anonymous to them. All your choices and the amount you will earn will remain con-
dential and anonymous, except if explicitly indicated otherwise. You will receive your earnings in
an envelope. The person that puts the money in the envelopes can only see the login number that
has randomly been assigned to you, and cannot match any names, student numbers, or faces with
the login numbers and the decisions made.
Payments There are several items in the experiment for which you can earn points. At the
end of the experiment, one item is randomly chosen and your points for that item are paid in
addition to the show-up fee (1 point is worth e 1). One of the participants is randomly chosen to
be an assistant during the experiment. There is a random component in the experiment. The task
of the assisting person will be to throw a dice which will determine the outcome.
No deception Remember, we have a strict no deception policy in this lab.
Questions Please remain seated and raise your hand if you have any questions, and wait for
the experimenter. Please remain silent throughout the experiment.
Part 1.
In the rst stage, all group members receive the same 15 questions. You will see a matrix with one
missing segment at the bottom right. Your task is to identify the segment that would logically t
at the position of the missing segment, by choosing from the suggested answers. You can make
your choice by clicking the corresponding number on the right of your screen. [A screen shot with
an example question was provided.]
You can go back and forth between the questions. There is a time limit of 8 minutes. The
time remaining is indicated on your screen.
After the time limit, we will rank all 4 people in your group depending on the number of questions
answered correctly. The person with the highest score will get rank 1, and the person with the
lowest score will get rank 4. In case of ties, the computer will randomly determine who gets the
higher rank. After this, you will get some questions regarding how well you think you did.
We then randomly divide the group in 2 players A and 2 players B. Every player A will be matched
35against a player B. If your rank is higher than the player with which you are matched, you can
receive 10 points.
Part 2.
All four group members have now nished with the questions, and we have determined the rank of
every person.
We now ask you to indicate how likely you think that you are among the top 2 of your group.
You can indicate this on a scale from 0 to 100%. Indicating 0% means that you are sure you are
not among the best 2 of your group, while indicating 100% means that you are sure you are among
the top 2 of your group. Similarly, 50% indicates that you think it is equally likely that you are
among the best 2 of your group, or that you are not among the best 2 of your group.
We will pay you for the accuracy of your estimate. You earn more points for this item if your
estimate is more accurate. The formula that is used to calculate the amount of money you earn is
chosen in such a way that your expected earnings are highest when you report to us what you really
believe. Reporting any value that diers from what you believe decreases your expected score for
this item. If you are interested, you can nd some detailed examples of this to see how this works.
[An explanation with examples was available to participants, see below.]
The role of player A and player B We matched you with one other randomly chosen person from
your group. You are either Player A or B, and this is randomly determined.
[baseline] None of the players can see the other player's estimate of being in the top 2.
[social] Player A will not see the estimate by player B that he or she is among the best two
in the group, but player B will see the estimate by Player A that he or she is among the best two
of the group.
[baseline and social] Later on in the experiment, we will compare the rank of player A with the
rank of player B, and for that item the player with the highest rank receives 10 points, the other
nothing. Both of you will see who has the highest rank, and this ends the stage.
[strategic deterrence and lure] Player A will not see the estimate by player B that he or she is
among the best two in the group, but player B will see the estimate by Player A that he or she is
among the best two of the group.
Later on in the experiment, after player B has observed the estimate of player A, player B will
choose between two options: IN or OUT.
If player B chooses OUT, then for that item player B receives 3.5 [5.5] points and player A auto-
matically receives 10 points. Both players will see who has the highest rank, and this ends the stage.
[deterrence] If player B chooses IN, we will compare the rank of player A with the rank of player
B, and for that item the player with the highest rank receives 10 points, the other nothing. Both
36of you will see who has the highest rank, and this ends the stage.
[lure] If player B chooses IN, we will compare the rank of player A with the rank of player B.
For this item, Player A receives 25 points if (s)he is the highest ranked player, and 15 points if
(s)he is not the highest ranked player. Player B receives 10 points if (s)he is the highest ranked
player, and 0 points if (s)he is not the highest ranked player. Both of you will see who has the
highest rank, and this ends the stage.
You can see what role you have on the top left of your screen (see the example below). [Par-
ticipants could see their role on the next screen.]
Determination of your score What follows is a brief explanation about the determination
of your score, showing that it is in your interest to report truthfully what you believe in order to
maximize your expected earnings.
The score is determined as follows. You start with 10 points. We subtract points depending on
how close your reported belief is to the outcome. The outcome is set to 1 if you are in the top 2,
and to 0 if you are not.
For instance, if you report 70% (.7), and you are in the top 2 (outcome is 1), you are .3 away from
the outcome, while if you are not in the top 2 (outcome is 0), you are .7 away from the outcome.
The dierence with the outcome is squared and multiplied by 10, and then subtracted from the
10 points that you start with. Thus in the example with 70%: if you are in the top 2, this gives
you 10 10(:3)2 = 9:1. If you are not in the top 2, this gives 10  10(:7)2 = 5:1. You would weight
these two scores by your belief about the likelihood of each occurring.
Larger dierences between your reports and the outcome decrease your score proportionally more
than small dierences. To minimize the expected dierence, and maximize your expected score,
you should report what you believe.
The following examples illustrate that your expected score is highest when you report your true
beliefs. All numbers used are for illustrations only and are no indication for the decisions for you
to take.
Example 1
You believe 50% and report 50%. As a simple example: if you believe there is a 50% chance you
are in the top 2, and you report 50%, then there is always a dierence of .5 with the outcome,
and since this is squared we always subtract 10 times (0:5)2 points from your score, i.e. 2.5 points.
Your expected score is 7.5.
You believe 50% but you report 100%. If you report 100%, then in one case there is no dier-
ence (if you are in the top 2) and no points are subtracted. But in the other case the dierence is
1 (if you are not in the top 2), and then we subtract 10 times (1)2 from your score. If you believe
the likelihood of being in the top 2 is 50%, you expect this to happen in 50% of the cases, so the
amount subtracted would be 10(0.5) = 5. This gives you an expected score of 5, which is lower
than if you report your belief of 50%.
Example 2
You believe 70% and report 70%. As another example, suppose that you think there is a 70%
37likelihood that you are among the best 2. If you report 70%, your score will be either 9.1 (if you
are in the top 2) or 5.1 (if you are not in the top 2). You believe that with 70% chance your score
will be 9.1, and with 30% your score will be 5.1. So your expected score is 0:7(9:1)+0:3(5:1) = 7:9:
You believe 70% and report 100%. Now suppose that, instead of reporting this belief of 70%,
you report another number. For instance, you report 100% (1). This means that if you are in the
top 2, the outcome is as predicted, and you get 10  10(0)2 = 10 points. If you're not in the top 2,
you are 1 away from the outcome, and your score will be 10 10(1)2 = 0. Since you actually expect
to be in the top 2 with 70% chance, your expected score is 7. This is lower than if you would have
reported 70%.
You believe 70% and report 20%. The same is true if you report a number below your belief,
for instance 20% (.2). If you are in the top 2, your score would be 10   10(0:8)2 = 3:6 points. If
you're not in the top 2, your score will be 10   10(0:2)2 = 9:6. Since you actually expect to be in
the top 2 with 70% chance, your expected score is 0:7(3:6)+0:3(9:6) = 5:4, again lower than if you
would have reported 70%.
The table below shows the expected scores for some more possible beliefs you may have and reports
you give. As you can see, expected scores are highest when the reported belief is equal to the true
belief (the cells on the diagonal that are highlighted in green).
Expected scores
Your Belief (%)
Your report
(%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
10 9.9 9.1 8.3 7.5 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.3 3.5 2.7 1.9
20 9.6 9 8.4 7.8 7.2 6.6 6 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.6
30 9.1 8.7 8.3 7.9 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.1
40 8.4 8.2 8 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.2 7 6.8 6.6 6.4
50 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
60 6.4 6.6 6.8 7 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8 8.2 8.4
70 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.3 6.7 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.3 8.7 9.1
80 3.6 4.2 4.8 5.4 6 6.6 7.2 7.8 8.4 9 9.6
90 1.9 2.7 3.5 4.3 5.1 5.9 6.7 7.5 8.3 9.1 9.9
100 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
[baseline] Part 3.
Based on your true ranking in the group, we will send you a report. The report will say if you are
among the two best of your group, or if you are not among the two best of your group.
However, sometimes the report will be incorrect. The way this works is as follows.
If you are not among the top two of your group, then the report will always be correct and
inform you that you are not among the best two of your group.
38If you are among the top two of your group, the report is mistaken in half of the cases. That
is, in half of the cases, the report correctly informs you that you are among the top two of your
group. In the other half of the cases, the report is incorrect and says you were not among the top
two of your group, even if you were.
Whether or not the report you receive is correct when you are among the top two of your group,
depends on the outcome of a dice throw by the assistant. You will not see the outcome, but if the
assistant throws 1, 2, or 3, you will receive a correct report when you are among the top two. If
the assistant throws 4, 5, or 6, you will receive an incorrect report when you are among the best
two of your group. (For some groups, the incorrect report is sent after dierent values of the dice,
but in any case the report is incorrect in half of the cases when you are among the best 2.)
After you see the report, we will ask you if you think the report is more likely to be correct
or incorrect.
You earn 10 points if you are right.
[baseline] Part 4
In this part, we ask you some questions about the scenario below. The rst part is always the
same, but some additional information is given in the question, so please read it carefully. For this
part, we randomly choose a question and this is treated as a single item.
Scenario Consider two machines placed in two sides of a large production hall, left side = L
and right side = R. The two machines produce rings, good ones and bad ones. Each ring that
comes from the left machine, L, has a 50% chance of being a good ring and a 50% chance of being
a bad ring. Each ring that comes from the right machine, R, is good. Both machines produce 100
rings every day.
The mechanic visits the production hall every day, and randomly examines one of the machines by
taking one ring. On some days, he takes a ring from the left machine, and the other days he takes
a ring from the right machine. Suppose the ring he takes is good.
We will ask you if it is more likely that the mechanic went to the left or right machine.
Example question `On 50% of the days, the mechanic takes a ring from the left machine, and
the other 50% of the days from the right machine. Of the rings that come from the left machine,
on average half are good and half are bad. Each ring that comes from the right machine is good.
Imagine the ring he takes is good. Is it more likely to come from the left or right machine?'
You will get 3 questions like this one. We vary the percentage of days that the mechanic goes
to the left or right machine, but everything else remains the same.
You earn 10 points if you are right.
39Part 5.
[baseline and social] In this part, you are informed if player A or B has the highest rank.
[strategic deterrence and lure] Player A will not see the estimate by player B that he or she is
among the best two in the group.
Player B will see the estimate by Player A that he or she is among the best two of the group,
and then gets the choice between two options: IN or OUT.
[We repeated the instructions of Part 2 in which the payos were given for this item].
40Appendix B. Model
In this appendix we characterize the equilibrium set of the signaling game described in section
3.1. We characterize the set of equilibria, and prove the following properties of equilibrium behavior
in the games used in our experiment: (i) In the Deter treatment, where the sender has a relatively
high outside option, he will over-report to appear strong and deter the receiver from entering the
tournament, (ii) In the Lure treatment, where the sender has a relatively low outside option, he
will underreport to appear weak and encourage the receiver to enter the tournament.
We start with repeating the payo structure and introducing some notation and denitions.
We then analyze the equilibrium set when the payos are symmetric, as in the Deter treatment.
After establishing in section B.2 the conditions under which any type of equilibrium may occur
(pooling, separating, partial separating), we summarize in section B.3 the entire characterization
of the equilibrium set (see Theorem B.9). In section B.4 we compute the predictions of the model
for the payo used in the experiment. We rst (section B.4) use the parameters adopted in the
deterrence treatment of our experiment to show that over-reporting is part of the equilibrium in that
treatment. We then (section B.4) do the same for the Lure treatment: we extend the analysis to
asymmetric payos and then show that underreporting is equilibrium behavior with the parameters
of the Lure treatment. The nal section B.5 presents the intuitive reason for the existence of the
deterrence and lure equilibrium. A reader who does not want to follow the computational detail
can get a good idea of the argument from the two sections B.3 and B.5.
B.1. Preliminaries. Recall that i
j denotes player i 2 f1;2g of type j 2 f0;1g. The sender is
indexed as player 1 and the receiver as player 2. A weak player is indexed as 0, a strong player as
1. We assume that the payos of players are symmetric as in the following payo table:
(5)
2
0 2
1
1
0 0;0 b;a
1
1 a;b d;d
This is the case for the Deter treatment. We will return later to the Lure treatment which has
asymmetric payos. We consider:
(6) a  O2  d  0  b;
where O2 is player 2's outside option. This implies that Out strictly dominates In for a weak
player 2. Strategies of player 1 are functions from type to probability on signals: 1(1;) 2
(T). Strategies of player 2 are functions from type and signal of player 1 to probability on
actions: 2(2;t;) 2 (fIn;Outg)). To lighten notation we call in the following (2
1;t0;In) =
r;(2
1;t1;In) = s, where t0 and t1 are the low and high message respectively.
We now make precise what we mean by over- and underreporting.
Denition B.1. (Over- and underreporting) We call an equilibrium in our game under-
reporting if:
(7) 1(1
0;t0) = 1;1(1
1;t0)   2 (0;1):
that is if the low type only reports a low type, and the high type reports a low type with positive
probability. We call an equilibrium over-reporting equilibrium if:
(8) 1(1
1;t1) = 1;1(1
0;t1)   2 (0;1):
41B.2. Types of equilibria.
B.2.1. Monotonic equilibria. We rst examine monotonic equilibria, i.e., those where the function
1 ! 1 is increasing (higher types give higher signal). We then show that non-monotonic equilibria
do not exist. In our simple model an equilibrium is monotonic if:
(9) 1(1
1;t1)  1(1
0;t1)
and we say it is strictly monotonic if the inequality (9) is strict.
The equilibrium set is easily characterized if we take into account the following. Take the
(;) 2 [0;1]2 pairs describing as in (7) and (8) the strategy of player 1.
Lemma B.2. If (6) holds, then for generic payos the only monotonic equilibria are either the
fully revealing truthful, or the two pooling (at the low and high type respectively) or the under or
over-reporting equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that an equilibrium exists with (;) 2 (0;1)2. This implies that the two signals
are indierent for both types of player 1. This is equivalent to
(s   r)(b   O1) = (r   s)(d   O1) = 2c
which can only hold if s 6= r and which in turn implies
(10) O1 = (b + d)=2:
So except for non-generic cases in which the equality (10) holds, there is no equilibrium where
(;) 2 (0;1)2, so equilibria are on the boundary of the unit square. Monotonicity requires 1   ,
which excludes the strategies with  +  > 1 (such as the \reverse fully revealing" equilibrium
(;) = (1;1)). So we have either one of the three residual corners of the square, or a point in the
two sides f0g  (0;1) (under-reporting equilibria) and (0;1)  f0g (over-reporting equilibria). 
B.2.2. Fully pooling and fully separating equilibria.
Lemma B.3. If (6) holds a fully revealing equilibrium exists if and only if:
(11) 2c  maxfO1   b;d   O1g
Proof. Suppose that player 1 is following the truthful strategy. At the best response of player 2,
he chooses Out when he is low type for any signal, and when of high type chooses In if and only
if the signal is t0, because:
m(1
0jt0) = 1;m(1
0jt1) = 0;
where m(;t) denotes the posterior belief upon observing message t. So the best response of 2 to
the truthful strategy of player 1 has r = 1;s = 0. To determine the set of parameters for which the
fully revealing strategy of player 1 is part of an equilibrium we determine now when this strategy
is a best response to r = 1;s = 0. With this strategy of 2, type 1
0 prefers t0 to t1 if and only if
2c  O1  b; and type 1
1 prefers t1 to t0 if and only if 2c  d O1. These conditions are equivalent
to (11). 
As intuitively clear this equilibrium exists for all costs large enough. For the high signal pooling
we have (if we ignore the case (a + d)=2 = O2):
Lemma B.4. If (6) holds a pooling equilibrium at the high signal exists if and only if either:
(12) (a + d)=2 < O2 and O1   b  maxf2c;d   O1g
42or:
(13) (a + d)=2 > O2 and b   O1  maxf2c;O1   dg
Proof. Take a pooling equilibrium at the high signal. The best response of player 2 is determined
by r and s given the posterior belief at t. Note that m(1
0jt1) = 1=2, and we can take m(1
0jt0) 2
[0;1] since the event t0 has probability zero in this equilibrium. At the best response given these
posteriors,
(14) r 2 [0;1] and s 2 sign(
1
2
 
O2   d
a   d
);
(where the sign correspondence is 1, 0 at positive and negative values, and the unit interval at 0.)
Consider now the best response of player 1 to such pairs (r;s). The condition that t1 is preferred
to t0 by both types of player 1 is equivalent to
(15) (s   r)(b   O1)  2c  (r   s)(d   O1):
Thus, a pooling equilibrium at high type exists if and only if there is a pair (r;s) that satises both
(14) and (15). We consider the two cases.
(1) If (a + d)=2 < O2 then s = 0 and (15) is now equivalent to r(O1   b)  2c  r(d   O1)
which is equivalent to (12);
(2) If (a + d)=2 > O2 then s = 1 and (15) is now equivalent to (1   r)(b   O1)  2c 
(1   r)(O1   d) which is equivalent to (13).

For the low signal pooling we have:
Lemma B.5. If (6) holds a pooling equilibrium at the low signal exists if and only if either:
(16) O2  (a + d)=2 and d   O1  maxf2c;O1   bg
or:
(17) O2  (a + d)=2 and O1   d  maxf2c;b   O1g
Proof. With r;s denoting as usual the probability that the high type Player 2 chooses In at t0 and t1
respectively, an equilibrium pooling on the low type exists if and only if with r 2 sign((a+d)=2 O2),
s 2 [0;1] the inequality
(r   s)(d   O1)  2c  (s   r)(b   O1)
holds. These hold if and only if (16) or (17) holds. 
In the following we can then focus on the under and over reporting equilibria; remember that we
have excluded by denition the fully pooling or fully separating equilibria from this set.
B.2.3. Under-reporting equilibria.
Lemma B.6. An under-reporting equilibrium exists if and only if the inequalities in 6 and
(18) d   O1  maxf2c;O1   bg
for player 1 and
(19) O2  (a + d)=2
for player 2 hold.
43Proof. We already know that at all equilibria, player 2 chooses Out at 2
0 irrespective of the signal.
We check whether an equilibrium exists with  2 (0;1]. At 2
1 with such a strategy of player 1,
player 2 chooses In at t in a best response if and only if the posterior m(1
0jt)  O2 d
a d . This is
never the case if the signal is t1, and it holds at t0 when 1
1+  O2 d
a d . So the strategy of player 2
has only one indeterminate value r  (2
1;t0;In) and we know that r 2 sign( 1
1+   O2 d
a d ).
Our last step is to check when the best response of player 1 to such strategy has the under-
reporting form, with  2 (0;1]. Since as we have seen player 2 exits at t1, choosing t1 gives
O1   c to the type 1
0 and gives O1 to the type 1
1. For a given r, t0 is better than t1 for type 1
0 if
O1 c < (1 (r=2))O1+(r=2)b, and t1 is indierent to t0 for type 1
1 if O1 = (1 (r=2))O1+(r=2)d c.
These two conditions are satised if for some r 2 (0;1):
r(d   O1) = 2c > r(O1   b)
which is equivalent to the additional condition (18). 
The equilibrium is based on the fact that player 1 may be willing to pay the cost of signaling t0
to lure player 2 in the tournament to get the payo d; the gain is (r=2)(d O1) and is equal to the
cost c. Player 2 at 2
1 may choose In at the low signal t0 because may get the high payo a from
1
0 or the lower payo d from 1
1, but overall this is the same as the Out payo O2.
B.2.4. Over-reporting equilibria. A similar analysis yields:
Lemma B.7. An over-reporting equilibrium exists if and only if the inequalities in 6 and
(20) O1   b  maxf2c;d   O1g
for player 1 and
(21) O2  (a + d)=2
for player 2 hold.
Proof. In this case at equilibrium 1(1
1;t1) = 1, and 1(1
0;t1)  . The posterior beliefs are
m(1
0jt0) = 1 and m(1
0jt1) = 
1+. Player 2 weakly prefers In to Out if and only if 
1+  O2 d
a d ,
which is equivalent to  = O2 d
a O2 = 1=. His strategy is to choose Out at 2
0 and 2(2
1;t0;In) =
1;2(2
1;t1;In) = s. The variables determining the equilibrium are s and ; s is constrained to:
s 2 sign(

1 + 
 
O2   d
a   O2);
and  is determined by the best response of player 1. He prefers t1 to t0 at 1
1 and is indierent
between t1 and t0 at 1
0 if for some s 2 (0;1), 2c > (1   s)(d   O1) and 2c = (1   s)(O1   b).
Together these conditions are equivalent to (20) above. 
To complete the full characterization of the equilibrium set, we examine non-monotonic equilibria.
Lemma B.8. Non-monotonic equilibria do not exist.
Proof. An equilibrium is non-monotonic only if (1
1;t1) < (1
0;t1); i.e., if 1    < : It is easy to
see that the fully revealing non-monotonic equilibrium (both players 1 are always dishonest) does
not exist. In that case,  =  = 1. In that case, a strong player 2 chooses Out after t0 and In after
t1: It is easy to verify that player 1 does not deviate at 1
0 if O1  b   2c; and does not deviate at
1
1 if O1  d + 2c: This requires d + 2c  b   2c which is incompatible with b  d for any c > 0:
44Consider next the case with  2 (0;1) and  = 1: A strong player 2 chooses Out following t0 as
this can now only come from a strong player 1. If player 1 is indierent between t0 and t1 after 1
1;
and prefers t1 after 1
0; we must have:
s(b   O1)  2c = s(O1   d);
but these can never be simultaneously satised for d  b and c > 0: Intuitively, indierence by a
strong player 1 requires that he is willing to incur costs c to encourage a strong player 2 to choose
Out: This requires that he values the outside option more than competing with a strong player 2,
so O1 > d: But then a weak player 1 must surely also like player 2 to choose Out; since for him the
payo from competing with a strong player 2 is even worse: b < d; and would then deviate to t0:
Consider next the case with  2 1 and  2 (0;1): A strong player 2 chooses In following t1 as
this can now only come from a weak player 1. If player 1 is indierent after 1
0 and prefers t0 after
1
1; we must have:
r(O1   d)  2c = r(b   O1);
but this can never be satised for d  b and c > 0: Intuitively, if even a weak player 1 is willing
to pay a cost to encourage a strong player 2 to choose In; then a strong player 1 also prefers the
strong player 2 to choose In and would deviate to t1: 
B.3. Summary. We can summarize the previous sections characterizing the equilibria. A verbal
description of the equilibrium set may be helpful. When the cost of lying is high compared to the
other payos, the only equilibrium is the fully revealing. With smaller lying cost, the equilibrium
correspondence separates into two branches, under and over reporting respectively, depending on
whether (d + b)=2  O1 (in which case we have the under-reporting branch, see equation (23)) or
the opposite holds. The behavior in these two branches is similar. In the under-reporting, when
O2  (a + d)=2 we have a truly under-reporting equilibrium, where the high type reports the low
type with positive probability. When O2 is smaller, the equilibrium becomes a pooling equilibrium.
The behavior of the over-reporting branch is similar. Figure 6 describes the type of equilibrium for
dierent values of the parameters.
The following theorem gives a complete characterization of the equilibrium.
Theorem B.9. For generic payos, in the interesting case a  O2  d  0  b;
(a) (Fully revealing truthful branch): There is a fully revealing equilibrium if
(22) 2c  maxfO1   b;d   O1g
(b) (Under-reporting branch): There is an under-reporting equilibrium if and only if:
(23) d   O1  maxf2c;O1   bg
(24) O2  (a + d)=2
with strategies 1(1
0;t0) = 1;1(1
1;t0) =  = a O2
a d and
2(2
1;t0;In) = r =
2c
d   O1;2(2
1;t1;In) = s = 0:
There is a pooling equilibrium at the low signal if (i) condition (23) holds and O2  (a + d)=2,
sustained by 2(2
1;t0;In) = 1;2(2
1;t1;In) = 0, or (ii) condition (24) holds and O1   d 
maxf2c;b   O1g sustained by 2(2
1;t0;In) = 0;2(2
1;t1;In) = 1.
45Figure 6. Equilibrium set and parameter values. The gure describes the
type of equilibrium for values of the outside option O1 and the lying cost c. The
left panel reports the case where O2 < (a + d)=2; the right panel reports the case
where O2 > (a + d)=2.
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(c) (Over-reporting branch): There is an over-reporting equilibrium if and only if:
(25) O1   b  maxf2c;d   O1g
and
(26) O2  (a + d)=2
with strategies 1(1
0;t1) =  = O2 d
a d ;1(1
1;t0) = 0 and
2(2
1;t0;In) = r = 1;2(2
1;t1;In) = s = 1  
2c
O1   b
:
There is a pooling equilibrium at the high signal if (i) condition (25) holds and O2  (a+d)=2,
sustained by 2(2
1;t0;In) = 1;2(2
1;t1;In) = 0, or (ii) condition (26) holds and b   O1 
maxf2c;O1   dg sustained by 2(2
1;t0;In) = 0;2(2
1;t1;In) = 1.
Remark B.10. Note that some of the pooling equilibria are counterintuitive: they are sustained by
the belief that a strong player 2 chooses Out after the low signal but In after the high signal. While
these types of pooling equilibria are Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, it is easy to show that they do not
survive equilibrium renements such as "D1" (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
B.4. The experimental design. We nally consider a game which is closer to the one used in
our experimental sessions.
The strategic Deter treatment. In the strategic Deter treatment payos were symmetric, so the
analysis of above applies. Specically, if we subtract 5 from all payos, and make use of the fact
that ties are broken by random assignment of the win outcome, the payos were:
(27)
2
0 2
1
1
0 0;0  5;5
1
1 5; 5 0;0
46and outside options O1 = 5 for player 1 and O2 = 0:5 for player 2 in the treatment with the high
outside option. This is the case O1   b = 10  maxf2c;d   O1g = 2c because d   O1 =  5, and
(a+d)=2 = 2:5 > O2 = 0:5, hence (provided costs c are suciently low) we are in the over reporting
branch (see theorem B.9).13
The Lure treatment. In the Lure treatment the payos from entering the tournament were not
symmetric, and we represent them as follows:
(28)
2
0 2
1
1
0 e;d g;f
1
1 a;b e;d
where a = 25;b = 0;d = 5;e = 20;f = 10;g = 15, and O1 = 10;O2 = 5:5 (again using the fact that
ties are broken by random assignment of the win outcome). Note that
(29) for all ;O1 < v1();f > O2 > d > b
We look for equilibria of the under-reporting form, as in lemma (B.6).
Lemma B.11. An under-reporting equilibrium of the game with tournament payos (28) exists if
(29) and
(30) e   O1  2c
hold.
The proof is a simple computation.
B.5. Deterrence and luring equilibria. The intuition for the strategic deterrence equilibrium
is clear, and has been presented in the section B.3. For the lure equilibrium, note that player 2
of the low type prefers Out to In irrespective of what outcome he is expecting in the tournament.
The high type will choose In if he gives enough weight to the event that he is facing a low type. At
a monotonic under-reporting equilibrium the high signal t1 reveals that the type is high, so player
1 of low type will not incur the cost of lying when by doing so he could only tempt player 2 to
choose Out. The high type player 1 may be made indierent between telling the truth and thus
forcing player 2 out, or luring him by stating the low type, paying the cost, and getting with enough
probability to reap the benet of a match with a high type player 2. He can be made indierent
between these two options when the extra gain from luring the receiver (the quantity r(e   O1))
can be made at least equal to the cost 2c, for some r the probability that the high type player 2
plays In after a low signal. This is what condition (30) insures.
13In the Deter treatment with the low outside option for player 2 the corresponding payo was O
2 =  1:5. Note that
in this case a  d  0  O
2  b so that condition (6) is not satised. It is easy to show, however, that the results are
qualitatively similar in this case. With the payos in the experiment, we would be in the case with pooling at the
high signal, a limit case of overreporting.
47Appendix C. Survey: Design and results
We recruited 82 participants from the same database that we used for the main experiment.
None of the participants participated in any of the previous sessions. There were 5 sessions with
between 12 and 22 participants. 40 out of 82 participants were female, and the mean age was 22.
Participants received a at fee of 10, and each session took about 30 minutes.
Participants received the instructions on their screen. The survey consisted of eight questions
in total (see below). In the rst four questions, we asked participants to list situations in which
appearing over or undercondent could be eective. The purpose of these questions was to make
them realize how easy/hard it was to think of any such situations. Our main questions of interest
were questions ve and six, in which we asked them how frequently they nd themselves in situations
where appearing under or overcondent can be eective.
We reversed the order of questions between participants: half of them received the questions
about undercondence rst, the other half received the questions about overcondence rst.
They could answer questions 5-8 on a ve point scale (ranging from very rarely to very frequently)
and we gave them the option to answer the question with "don't know." The distribution of answers
is reported in Table C1. The full instructions and questions are provided below.
Table C1: Distribution of responses (percentages)
Question 1 2 3 4 5 Don't know
Appearing overcondent is eective (Q5) 4.88 14.63 24.39 50.00 4.88 1.22
Appearing undercondent is eective (Q6) 21.95 31.71 24.39 17.07 3.66 1.22
Others appear overcondent (Q7) 1.22 14.63 23.17 45.12 9.76 6.10
Others appear undercondent (Q8) 12.20 30.49 21.95 23.17 7.32 4.88
Notes: Answers are on a scale from 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very frequently).
Instructions and questions Thank you for your participation in this short experiment. It
takes about 20-30 minutes to complete, and you will earn 10 for your participation. Talking is
not permitted and we ask you to make sure that your cell phone is turned o completely. Please
raise your hand if you have any questions. The experiment consists of a short survey. You are not
matched to any other participant and your earnings do not depend on the answers that you (or
anyone else) give.
Please answer the questions to the best of your ability. Your answers will be treated condentially.
The questions that follow are about situations in which you interact with one or more other
persons.
[version for participants with even numbers]
Question 1) Can you briey describe situations (real or hypothetical) in which you think it
might be useful to appear to others more condent about your ability to succeed in an activity
or at a task than you really are? You can list as many dierent situations as you like, up to a
maximum of ten situations. You can, for instance, think of situations in the domains of sports,
school, work, or social life, amongst others.
Question 2) For each of the situations you just described under Question 1, have you found
it to be eective to appear more condent than you were? Or if the situation you described was
hypothetical, do you think it would be eective?
48Question 3) Can you briey describe situations (real or hypothetical) in which you think it
might be useful to appear to others less condent about your ability to succeed in an activity or at
a task than you really are? You can list as many dierent situations as you like, up to a maximum
of ten situations. You can, for instance, think of situations in the domains of sports, school, work,
or social life, amongst others.
Question 4) For each of the situations you just described under Question 3, have you found
it to be eective to appear less condent than you were? Or if the situation you described was
hypothetical, do you think it would be eective? We will now ask you some questions about how
frequently you nd yourself in dierent types of situations. You can indicate your answer on a
5-point scale, ranging from 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very frequently). There is also an option not to
give an answer in case you do not know the answer.
Question 5) How frequently do you nd yourself in situations where it could be eective to
appear to others more condent about your ability to succeed in an activity or at a task than you
really are?
Question 6) How frequently do you nd yourself in situations where it could be eective to
appear to others less condent about your ability to succeed in an activity or at a task than you
really are?
Question 7) How frequently do you nd yourself in situations where someone else appeared to
you to be more condent about his or her ability to succeed in an activity or at a task than (s)he
should have been?
Question 8) How frequently do you nd yourself in situations where someone else appeared to
you to be less condent about his or her ability to succeed in an activity or at a task than (s)he
should have been?
What is your age?
What is your gender (male or female)?
What is your eld of study?
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. Please remain seated until your table
number is called. If your table number is called, please bring the card with your table number with
you and you will receive your payment.
49Appendix D. Regression Tables
Table 3: Determinants of condence (scale 0 { 100)
Dependent var: : Confidence (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of correct answers 3.50*** 3.52*** 3.52*** 3.32***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40)
Social 0.29 0.05 0.08 -1.74
(2.94) (4.15) (4.07) (4.12)
Deter (low and high) 3.54 3.06 9.21** 9.26**
(2.31) (3.25) (4.02) (4.07)
Lure -5.55** 1.06 0.57 1.06
(2.64) (3.70) (4.77) (4.79)
Sender 0.26 0.65 1.02
(3.31) (3.27) (3.26)
Social  Sender 0.47 0.16 1.82
(5.88) (5.77) (5.82)
Deter  Sender 0.96 -0.00 -0.57
(4.59) (5.43) (5.48)
Lure  Sender -13.21** -13.21** -15.18**
(5.24) (6.47) (6.46)
Female -3.06 -2.57
(2.76) (2.78)
Deter  Female -11.00** -12.30**
(5.20) (5.24)
Deter  Sender  Female -0.71 -0.58
(6.26) (6.31)
Lure  Female 1.96 -0.04
(6.27) (6.28)
Lure  Sender  Female -1.00 0.51
(7.97) (8.04)
Familiar with conditional probs. 4.46**
(1.93)
Constant 33.05*** 32.78*** 33.76*** 31.54***
(3.75) (4.16) (4.22) (8.97)
Observations 464 464 464 462
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.26
Adj. R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23
Notes: OLS estimates. Other control variables in model (4) are: familiarity with
Raven test, study category, age, number of siblings, birth order, member of
sports club, entity theory question. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
50Table 4: Determinants of entering
Dependent var: choice is In Deter Lure
(high outside option)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own condence 0.044*** 0.015** 0.014* 0.012*** 0.007 0.008
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Opponent's condence -0.029*** -0.005
(0.010) (0.003)
Condence is lowerz -0.619*** -0.621*** -0.412** -0.414**
(0.138) (0.141) (0.181) (0.190)
Female -0.096 0.040
(0.203) (0.149)
Number correct answers -0.019 0.016
(0.042) (0.046)
Risk aversiony -0.030 0.044
(0.080) (0.044)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
Pseudo R-squared 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.26 0.30 0.32
Notes: Probit estimates, reporting marginal eects. zLower condence is equal to 1 if receiver's
condence is lower than the paired sender's, and 0 otherwise.yEight missing observations
were replaced by the mean in model (3). St. err. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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